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PREFACE: TOWARDS A TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY INVESTMENT AGREEMENT
Joseph E. Stiglitz*
Investment agreements have rightly come under attack in recent years. Many 
years ago, there was an attempt to arrive at a multilateral investment agreement, 
along the lines of the World Trade Organization (WTO) multilateral trade agree-
ment. That effort failed. Because these agreements have taken on a central role in 
recent trade agreements, and because they have increasingly become a stumbling 
block, it is important to understand better both the politics and economics of 
these agreements.1
There are two underlying questions: what motivated the drive for these agree-
ments? What was supposed to be protected? If investors were worried about 
nationalization (expropriation), in most cases, they could have bought insurance 
from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), part of the World 
Bank Group, or from national authorities that offered similar protection. Besides, 
expropriations have been a rarity in recent decades. This suggests that something 
else drove the Investment Agenda. I will return to this question at the end.
First, though, I want to describe what I believe a ‘good’ agreement might look 
like—something markedly different from what has appeared in recent trade and 
bilateral investment treaties.
Basic Premises
Any investment agreement should begin with two basic predicates:
(1) The provision of justice is a basic public function that should not be privat-
ized; the current system of dispute resolution privatizes this function, and for 
* Parts of this preface were previously distributed as a series of Roosevelt Institute Policy Briefs, 
Tricks of the Trade Deal: Six Big Problems with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 2016. I am indebted to 
Felicia Wong, Nell Abernathy, Adam Hersh, Lori Wallach, and Lise Sachs for helpful discussions, 
and Matthieu Teachout and Debarati Ghosh for research and editorial assistance.
1 A decade ago, I wrote a long law review article of investment agreements (See Stiglitz, 2008). 
Since then, such agreements have proliferated, and their adverse consequences have become even 





no good reason—other than perhaps more favorable outcomes to corporations. 
The private system is very costly, putting poor countries at a disadvantage.2 The 
WTO appellate system proves that one can create well-functioning international 
commercial courts.
In opposing the investment agreement embedded in trade and investment pacts, 
I was among the more than 200 law and economics professors who signed a letter 
to the President in October 2017 describing the devastating deficiencies in the 
standard investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) process, focusing on problems 
with it from the perspective of US law and policy.3 We noted that:
Over the past two centuries, the United States has established a framework of rules 
that govern lawsuits against the government and continually refines them through 
democratic processes. These include rules on court procedures and evidence, which 
are designed to ensure the fairness, legitimacy and reliability of proceedings; on 
who may bring lawsuits and under what circumstances, which are designed to bal-
ance the right to sue with the need to ensure that government action is not made 
impossible due to unlimited litigation; on the power of courts, which are designed 
to ensure that judges do not overly intrude on legitimate policy decisions made by 
elected legislatures or executive officials; on appropriate remedies, which are crafted 
to achieve policy aims such as deterrence, punishment, and compensation; and on 
the independence and accountability of judges.
But the investment agreements overturn all of this.
However, through ISDS, the federal government gives foreign investors— and for-
eign investors alone—the ability to bypass that robust, nuanced, and democratic-
ally responsive US legal framework.
Specific objections include:  ‘. . .  ISDS proceedings lack many of the basic pro-
tections and procedures normally available in a court of law’, and ‘there is no 
oversight or accountability of the private lawyers who serve as arbitrators, many 
of whom rotate between being arbitrators and bringing cases for corporations 
against governments’.
I had separately written to Congress in May 2015 expressing some of my own 
concerns:4
The high cost of access to such legal mechanisms violate a basic tenet of US just-
ice: that legal institutions to resolve civil disputes are a public good to which all 
2 The costs of private arbitration are high—Australia reportedly spent more than $50 million 
defending against a suit from Philip Morris on ‘plain packaging’ regulation, similar to Uruguay’s 
regulation. There are incentives to drive up costs: arbitrators are paid by the hour (unlike profes-
sional judges).
3 The letter, issued 25 October 2017, is available at: http://bit.ly/2i7oiqS. The press release by 
Public Citizen is available at: http://bit.ly/2hTr5EP.
4 ‘Where Progressives and Conservatives Agree on Trade:  Current Investor–Trade Dispute 





should have access. Private tribunals that effectively require millions of dollars in 
legal costs to use will privilege big businesses with an advantage over small busi-
nesses and other stakeholders.
Still another objection relates to federalism. Investment agreements are signed by 
national governments, but they cover the behavior of sub-national governments 
as well. In the US, for instance, the federal government would have to provide 
compensation were a state or local government to be in breach of the investment 
agreement. (This is not just a hypothetical possibility: Mexico’s national govern-
ment had to pay for an action of a municipality—restricting the use of land in 
the center of a city being used as a toxic waste dump.) The risk this poses to fed-
eralism is obvious, as I mentioned in my 2015 letter:
[T] he investment protections written into US agreements extend to all actions 
taken by states and local governments. While these provisions do not necessarily 
proscribe the imposition of regulations, they impose a cost on US taxpayers for any 
loss in expected profits as a result. While the clear intent of the Constitution was 
to cede full authority for such regulation (other than, for instance, that affecting 
interstate commerce) to the States, the clear intent of these trade agreements is to 
use the Treaty Authority to limit the power of states and localities to regulate.
The problematic nature of resulting de facto federal authority over state actions 
(even actions which were never explicitly reserved for the Federal Government, 
and thus were reserved to the states) is heightened by the magnitude of the awards, 
discussed below, which could be well beyond the ability of a municipality to pay, 
were the burden shifted from the national government to the subnational unity. 
Since the agreement does not force a change in action, but simply compensation 
for the action, it is hard to see the national government agreeing to fund a persist-
ent action giving rise to an investment claim; thus, either the Federal government 
would impose the costs on the subnational authority—and since they are even 
more constrained than the federal government, they would be financially ‘forced’ 
to change their behavior—and would prohibit the action. The trade agreement 
is thus, in effect, binding the states and municipalities to the broad standards of 
conduct and potential liabilities in the treaty. This is irrespective of the issue or 
measure and whether such issue or measure is (possibly solely) within the domain 
of the subnational unity, at least as far as the investments of foreign firms, con-
stituting a major expansion of the reach of the Federal government in a way that 
arguably goes well beyond the Constitution.
We concluded in the joint 2017 letter:
Freed from the rules of US domestic procedural and substantive law that would 
have otherwise governed their lawsuits against the government, foreign corpor-
ations can succeed in lawsuits before ISDS tribunals even when domestic law 
would have clearly led to the rejection of those companies’ claims. Corporations 
are even able to re-litigate cases they have already lost in domestic courts. It is ISDS 
arbitrators, not domestic courts, who are ultimately able to determine the bounds 




(2) A basic function of the state is to protect the environment and citizens’ health 
and safety and to ensure the economy functions well; regulations are an import-
ant tool for accomplishing these basic functions. The imposition of regulations 
will adversely affect those who are being regulated. A corporation selling a prod-
uct which contains carcinogens will see its profits decrease if it is told it can’t sell 
the product. A firm that exploits its workers with unhealthy working conditions 
may see its profits decrease if it is told it can’t do that. A financial firm that is told 
that it can’t engage in predatory lending too will see its profits decrease. There is 
no end of ‘bad practices’ that corporations engage in, all for the purpose of mak-
ing money; and stopping them from doing so naturally reduces their profits.5 But 
all countries have decided that it is unconscionable to have to pay those corpor-
ations engaging in such nefarious actions for not engaging in them.
The magnitude of the change intended to be brought about by investment agree-
ments is brought out by a quote attributed to a Toronto lawyer, Barry Appleton, 
who has been creative in expanding corporate claims under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and was involved in suing Canada in both the 
Ethyl and SD Myers cases: ‘It wouldn’t matter if a substance was liquid plutonium 
destined for a child’s breakfast cereal. If the government bans a product and a US 
based company loses profits, the company can claim damages under NAFTA.’
One can view all of this within the perspective of rights in general, and prop-
erty rights in particular. Individuals have rights, for example, the right to free 
speech. Corporations are creations of the state, and as such have no inalienable 
rights. Whatever rights they may have are derived rights, derived from the rights 
of those that are stakeholders in the firm (e.g. the rights of the ‘owners’) or rights 
that are given to them by the laws that create them. Thus, modern corporations 
are created with limited liability, but this limited liability should not be absolute, 
but constructed in ways which serves societal interests. Thus, I argue below that 
when a corporation engages in actions which put lives of individuals or the envir-
onment in danger, the officers of the corporation should be held liable. In this 
view, then, corporations have no fundamental right to kill people, for example, 
through the sale of cigarettes, or opium, or other dangerous products. If they had 
that fundamental right, then (it could be argued) that they need to be compen-
sated for taking away that right through regulation.
The standard Coasian debate on property rights pitted smokers versus non-smok-
ers, suggesting that either assignment of property rights could lead to an efficient 
solution. One could give the property right of ‘air’ to smokers, in which case 
non-smokers would have to pay smokers not to smoke; or one could assign the 
property right to the non-smokers, in which case the smokers would have to 
5 Nobel Prize winners George Akerlof and Robert Shiller have written a beautiful book detail-




bribe the non-smokers if they wanted to smoke. In the cases under discussion 
here, though, societies have by and large come to a clear view: corporations (or 
for that matter individuals) have no inherent right to pollute, or to engage in 
other activities which inflict harm on others; and, therefore, there is no neces-
sity to compensate them when regulations are passed stopping them from doing 
so. Indeed, in many cases, those committing those harms can be sued for the 
damage imposed, though it is often hard to prove in any given case a link, even 
though for the population as a whole, the link is indisputable. Thus, most coun-
tries have adopted the polluter pay principle:  that the polluter not only is not 
compensated for stopping polluting, but that he has to pay for the damage that 
his pollution has caused.
Investment agreements (as they have been written in the past) turn all of this 
on its head. Those agreements say that governments have to pay polluters not to 
pollute, they have to pay cigarette and asbestos companies not to produce prod-
ucts that kill, and they have to pay banks not to engage in practices that exploit 
others. Of course, the agreements are filled with words that only lawyers can 
understand—and different lawyers understand them in different ways. A simple 
trade agreement like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement ran to some 
6,000 pages, ensuring that virtually no Congressman could have read it before he 
voted on it. And amongst those 6,000 pages, there would have been no passage 
with inflammatory words such as, ‘this agreement enshrines a corporation’s right 
to kill. A corporation shall be fully compensated for any law or regulation depriv-
ing corporations of this fundamental property right’. But this, in effect, is what 
the investment agreements do. They circumvent the standard way that property 
rights get assigned and re-assigned, through open democratic debate, and substi-
tute a subterfuge, a de facto reassignment through seemingly obscure provisions 
of a trade and investment agreement.
The power that these investment agreements give to corporations and the extent 
to which the normal democratic processes for regulation and legislation are 
undermined cannot be overestimated. As I  noted in the ISDS briefing paper 
written for the Roosevelt Institute,6 ‘Two arbitrators can, in effect, undermine 
decisions of Congress and the president, ordering billions of dollars in payments 
for their lost investment value and guesstimated lost profits. They can sue over 
pretty much any law, regulation, or government decision.’
Six Fundamental Questions
Any investment agreement has to answer six questions.
6 See Part I of the series of Roosevelt Institute Policy Briefs, Tricks of the Trade Deal: Six Big 




a) What is protected?
The objective of investment agreements should be to protect against discrimin-
ation against foreign firms. Existing agreements have done something quite differ-
ent: They have sought to curb the ability of the state to regulate, to legislate, and 
to redefine property rights. Rather than adhering to the well-established polluter 
pays principle, these agreements set a new precedent that governments would 
have to compensate corporations for not polluting or imposing other harms on 
others. TPP carved out an exemption that would allow for tobacco regulations 
to be passed without requiring the nation to compensate the tobacco company 
for losses. Every other area of regulation was seemingly left in—meaning, for 
example, nations could be sued for regulating carbon emissions or cutting sub-
sidies to the fossil fuel industry to address climate change. Not only should it be 
clear that no investment agreement should curtail the ability of government to 
regulate, so too, no investment agreement should curtail the ability of govern-
ment to end any corporate subsidy. Of course, this is especially true in the case of 
subsidies to fossil fuels.
Current agreements actually create discrimination against domestic firms: Foreign 
firms have rights not given to domestic firms, which encourages inversions, with 
all the adverse consequences for growth, development, and public finances that 
result. In the United States, Courts have ruled that the government does not have 
to compensate firms who experience a loss in profits or the value of their assets 
as a result of regulations, and for good reason: such compensation would hobble 
the ability of government to undertake actions to protect the health and safety of 
their citizens, protect the environment, or ensure a sound economy. Presumably 
banks would have had to be compensated when new regulations were passed to 
curb their excessive risk taking, their abusive credit card practices, their predatory 
lending, or other acts of malfeasance not covered by existing legislation. If such 
regulations had been in place when it was discovered that asbestos was danger-
ous, rather than the asbestos producers compensating those that their product 
injured (killed), the government would have had to compensate these firms for 
not producing their dangerous products.
Such suits are not just a fantasy: they have occurred repeatedly, most notably in 
areas of health and the environment. Philip Morris’ suit against Uruguay’s plain 
wrapping regulations for cigarettes is perhaps the most notorious example: the 
regulation worked.7 Smoking was discouraged, Philip Morris lost expected profits, 
7 Philip Morris v Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7. (The details of the case can be found 
here: http://bit.ly/2AIUTM8.) In this and the many other cases adjudicated under the investment 
agreements, no claim was made concerning discrimination, demonstrating that discrimination is 
not the central concern of these agreements. Although this case was ultimately decided in favor 
of Uruguay, it was on a 2–1 basis, so even this egregious case is not one that arbitrators deemed 




and so it felt justified in suing. Advocates of these provisions point out that they 
do not interfere with the ability to regulate: the government is not compelled to 
change its law, just to provide for compensation for those who are injured. But 
for cash-starved governments, the threat of massive payments has a chilling effect 
on regulation; and indeed, I believe that is one of the main intents—not just to 
compensate those who have lost through regulations, but the ‘preventive’ effect of 
discouraging such regulations. Thus, the adverse effects of the investment agree-
ments are not to be measured just by the suits that governments have lost, or 
even by the changes in policies that these suits have induced, but by the harder 
to measure but far broader negative impacts on desirable regulation or action.8
Anyone who participates in policy arenas touched by the investment agreement 
knows this situation well. The Investment Agreement sits there, in the fore-
ground, shaping the set of policies that a country should consider. One can hear 
the debate: If we do X, we will almost surely be sued by Y. The Retort: But won’t 
we win? The Answer: With the biased system of adjudication (the ISDS dispute 
settlement process described below), who knows? There is a risk we can lose, 
with no appeal. And besides, do we want this distraction? Do we want other 
foreign investors to read the dispute as if we are unfriendly to foreign investors? 
Normally, the conversation will end with something like this: It just doesn’t seem 
to be worth the risk. Isn’t there something else we can do that almost accom-
plishes what we want, but reduces the risk of running afoul of the investment 
agreement, at least in the minds of foreign investors?
I was in Chile in 2011 visiting the President and the Finance Minister. But my 
quiet conversations behind the scenes with those who formulate the law were 
equally telling. In the Chile–US Trade Agreement, which came into force in 
2004, there was a provision relating to the free flow of capital. Chile had had 
more stability in its exchange rate, and economy, partly because it had long 
had a system of capital controls on the influx of capital. Those, like me and the 
former head of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), José 
Antonio Ocampo, argued that this system was important in managing the ‘cap-
ital account’, in ensuring that excessive in and out flows didn’t create booms and 
busts that wreak havoc to the economy. Our views, which we articulated in a 
series of books and conferences, have now become mainstream.9
Organization weighed in with an amicus brief. What would happen if the host state’s measures 
were more cutting edge and hadn’t yet received the stamp of approval of an international body? 
The government would likely have had a much more difficult time defending itself.
8 Kyla Tienharra, ‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration:  A View from Political 
Science’ in Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2011) 
606, 615; Julia G Brown, ‘International Investment Agreements: Regulatory Chill in the Face 
of Litigious Heat?’ (2013) 3(1) Western Journal of Legal Studies. See also the chapter by Gus Van 
Harten and Dayna Nadine Scott in this volume.




Even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) supports capital account man-
agement along the lines we had been advocating. (Though, of course, earlier 
they had taken quite the opposite position, attempting to change their charter 
in Hong Kong in 1997 to allow them to put pressure on countries that had not 
fully liberalized. Fortunately, that earlier venture failed.) The nature of global 
capital flows is that there are surges into or out of developing countries. It is these 
surges that are so destructive. Sometimes the surge is created by ‘animal spirits’, 
a sudden change in views about whether, for example, East Asia is a safe place to 
put one’s money. Sometimes the surge is brought about by a change in a particu-
lar government policy. That was the case in 2011, when the US government had 
begun its most expansionary policy ever, driving not just short term interest rates 
to zero, but also longer term rates. Capital sought higher returns elsewhere. Not 
surprisingly, there was a surge to those that seemed strong and well managed, 
including Chile, Brazil, and Israel. This money brings with it more costs: at the 
time, the countries were booming, and didn’t need more stimulation. The inflow 
of money would have raised the exchange rate, hurting export industries, includ-
ing the new ones being established as part of the development process. There 
was a consensus, I would say, both among economists and among the ‘afflicted’ 
countries that something should be done to dampen these flows—to avoid the 
historically loaded term ‘capital controls,’ such interventions were called ‘capital 
account management techniques’.
Brazil, South Korea, Israel, and Indonesia went ahead. But Chile worried: if Chile 
did, would it be contravening the trade and investment agreement? Could it be 
sued? With what consequences? Even though the case for Chile taking action was 
overwhelming, it did not, and I believe that the trade and investment agreement 
was critical in that decision.
In the case of the TPP, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) claimed 
that in the agreement there is language to avoid the abuses of previous investment 
agreements. Others, however, had a different reading of TPP. What is unambigu-
ous is that there are massive ambiguities, providing a field day for lawyers. All of 
this is unnecessary. Arguably, a simpler statement could say: The purpose of invest-
ment agreement provisions is not to curtail regulation, but to ensure that regulations 
cannot be written to discriminate against foreign firms and cannot be enforced in a 
discriminatory manner.
But even this does not suffice: the 2008 crisis as well as the East Asian Financial 
crisis made it clear that cross-border capital flows can be very destabilizing, and 
need to be regulated differently, and more tightly, than domestic financial trans-
actions. Even the IMF now recognizes this.10




b) If there is a violation, what are the damages that can be collected?
A second key question is, if a government is found to violate the rights of an 
investor, what is the compensation that should be paid? A natural answer is that 
investors should be able to recover the amount they have spent. While that is the 
natural answer, it is not the answer in the typical investment agreements. Rather, 
these agreements allow investors to recover their expected profits.
The distinction is important for two reasons. First, because expected profits can 
be so much higher than the amount spent, this provision provides a strong incen-
tive for investors to sue. And secondly, while the amount spent can be ascertained 
with reasonable reliability, expected profits are conjectural.
Consider, for instance, Philip Morris’s suit against Uruguay for its tobacco regu-
lation. Is it reasonable to assume that smokers who could so easily be influenced 
not to smoke by a change in packaging would not have quit smoking eventually, 
perhaps as a result of an advertising campaign against smoking or social trends 
related to the growing awareness of the dangers of smoking? The capricious arbi-
tration system leaves it to three lawyers to decide what the company’s profits 
would have been in the absence of the regulation. Any economist knows how 
fraught such calculations are, and no economist would feel comfortable leav-
ing the decision up to a panel of three lawyers, especially when one of them has 
been picked by the suing corporation, and the other one appointed only with 
concurrence.
The analysis requires a highly speculative ‘counterfactual’—what the world 
would be like in the future but for the regulation. Good law tries to eschew such 
speculation. In this case, there was no need for reliance on such speculative cal-
culations; there is an alternative: reimbursing corporations for their investments.
Why, one might ask, should one have such a speculative and expansive basis for 
compensation when investors could be fully protected against losses? The answer 
is simple: current agreements are structured as if the objectives are to enrich the 
corporations and to have a chilling effect on all regulations. Simply compensating 
for the lost investment might not have sufficed for these purposes.
That the lawyers have failed in their calculation of ‘future profits’ seems clear 
from numerous decisions. For instance, in the widely cited Myers case,11 Canada 
was forced to compensate a company for a regulation prohibiting shipping cer-
tain toxic wastes to the US, even though the US prohibited the shipment, as did 
an international treaty. Any reasonable counterfactual would lead to the conclu-
sion that the toxic waste shipment would not have occurred even if Canada had 





introduced the ban, and, therefore, there was no loss in Myers’s expected profits. 
But the arbitration panel ruled otherwise.
Interestingly, awards have been paid even when there was corruption involved in 
getting the contract. While a war against corruption is being waged elsewhere, 
the fruits of corruption are being guaranteed in investment agreements.12
c) Who can bring an action?
Under a fair investment agreement—one not just focused on corporate inter-
ests— all stakeholders should have the right to pursue legal action if there has 
been a harm in violation of the agreement by either the regulatory state or the 
investor. However, under the standard investment agreements, ‘host’ country 
governments and citizens cannot sue foreign investors that violate local environ-
ment, public health, consumer protection, and labor laws—and they certainly do 
not have recourse to arbitration tribunals to redress their grievances. A balanced 
system would ensure that any rights that allow corporations to litigate violations 
should also be guaranteed to governments, civil society, and others affected by 
a violation on the part of corporations of legal rights of citizens and/or a failure 
of firms to live up to their responsibilities. The legal process for redress of a vio-
lation of a corporation’s rights seeks to bypass the normal legal process within 
the country. As I comment below, I am skeptical about the desirability of this 
kind of bypass. But if such a bypass should be granted to corporations, it should 
also be granted to other stakeholders in our economic system; and it needs to be 
recognized that if corporations have rights, they also have responsibilities, and 
those responsibilities include complying with all the laws of the land. And if one 
is skeptical of the ability of government to enforce the rights of corporations, one 
should be equally (or more) skeptical of the ability or willingness of governments 
to enforce the rights of citizens and others in a case where a large multinational 
corporation has violated those rights. Moreover, corporations have excelled in 
their ability to use cross-border legal machinations to avoid both taxes and legal 
liability: When corporations enter a country, they need to post bond or provide 
other surety that they will provide for any compensation for any harm they do to 
others. Most importantly, it must be possible to pierce the corporate veil and pass 
responsibility up through the increasingly complex web of global value chains; 
and since CEOs and other top managers often manage to avoid responsibility for 
their acts—with compensation coming out of the pockets of shareholders—there 
needs to be a system of holding managers accountable, including through prison 
12 In another famous case, Indonesia had to pay more than USD 300 million in compensation 
for canceling a contract that the IMF itself had strongly recommended being cancelled because of 
the conditions under which it had been obtained. Cemex Asia Holdings Ltd v Republic of Indonesia, 




terms, with extradition treaties embedded in investment agreements for malfea-
sance on the part of corporate officers.13
Over time, arbitration panels and new investment agreements have taken an 
increasingly expansive view of who can sue, including what it means to make an 
investment in a country. Simply having an office may be treated as an ‘invest-
ment’. The opportunities for suits for lost profits are unbounded: a small invest-
ment can bring large returns from litigations. Buyers of bonds may be considered 
as investors, and sue over any attempt at restructuring—possibly making restruc-
turing in practice impossible. Since the nineteenth century, there has been a 
principle that debtors have the rights to a fresh start; under extreme exigencies 
there needs to be debt write-down. But forcing the issuing country to compen-
sate a bondholder for the loss of value would de facto preventing that fresh start. 
I believe that investment agreements should (at most) have a narrow remit:  to 
protect those making substantial real investments in the country from a loss of 
their investments in a discriminatory manner as a result of a government action. 
As I noted earlier, this simple statement has to be qualified in two ways. There 
may be some situations (which should be explicitly specified) where differential 
treatment should be acceptable, for example, concerning cross-border financial 
flows. And there may be some actions, such as full expropriation without com-
pensation, which might be covered whether discriminatory or not (since firms 
can obtain insurance against the latter, for simplicity, I would not include that 
within the investment treaty).14
d) How can a private actor bring an action?
Among the most criticized aspects of investment agreements is that investors can 
sue governments directly, creating an asymmetry between states and investors 
that did not previously exist. Traditionally, only governments can sue investors 
(with limited exceptions, where governments agree to be sued for certain liabili-
ties), not the other way around. I believe that the approach should be similar to 
the WTO, where only governments can bring actions against government.
Many governments (such as Brazil) have made it clear that this system of ISDS 
is unacceptable. I agree. A firm (or another stakeholder) that believes that some 
provision of the agreement has been violated resulting in harm to the stakeholder 
13 Famously, in the Bhopal chemical disaster in India, it proved impossible to hold the officials 
of Union Carbide accountable. See Chapter 7 in Stiglitz (2006) for a brief discussion.
14 It should be obvious that even what appears to be a straightforward agreement in practice 
may entail many complexities, in particular, in deciding whether a particular action is discrim-
inatory. If the only seller of large cars is a foreign company, then a regulation pertaining to large 
cars but not to small cars could be viewed as discriminatory. Yet many countries make such dif-
ferentiation as a matter of public policy. The investment agreement should make clear that there 
should be a high bar in proving discrimination, i.e. deference should be given to the government 




should have recourse to petition its government to bring a case. If this provision 
was put in place, the worst abuses of ISDS would not occur. It is unlikely that 
the US government would have brought a case against Uruguay for its tobacco 
regulation or against Canada for prohibiting the shipment of toxic waste to the 
US. Requiring the government to bring the case puts the case at least through a 
filter, a judgment of whether the suit makes sense from the perspective of overall 
policy. A government where the given act would not have been deemed grounds 
of suit would be wary of bringing a suit against another government. The US 
government recognizes the right to interfere with the packaging of cigarettes. It 
knows that health advocates would like plain packaging, because such packaging 
discourages purchases. Health authorities know that it is internal political rea-
sons that are holding back such a requirement here—the power of the cigarette 
companies and tobacco farmers. Most government officials would secretly con-
gratulate Uruguay for doing what it is doing. Accordingly, it is hard to see how 
they could bring a suit against Uruguay, or if they did, whether they would put 
into the case the resources necessary to win.
e) What is the mechanism for adjudicating disputes? And under what ‘law’?
Disputes should be adjudicated according to broadly accepted rules of law. One 
of the most vilified, and rightly so, aspects of the investment agreements embod-
ied in TPP and other trade agreements, is that the judicial standards fall far 
below twenty-first century standards. The problems have, by now, been well doc-
umented, and could easily be remedied:
1) A case should only be brought after exhaustion of domestic remedies. Thus, a 
case would be heard by an international tribunal only after the plaintiff had 
gone through the country’s court system. The plaintiff could bring such a 
case if they had been discriminated against, either in terms of the regulation 
itself or in terms of the way that domestic courts had treated them. (Recall, 
I have argued that the only protection should be for discrimination. There 
can, of course, be complaints about other laws, but these are complaints that 
should be evaluated solely in terms of the countries’ constitution and other 
laws. A foreigner should have no special standing. If the investor doesn’t like 
the legal framework, he doesn’t have to invest in the country. But he should 
have no right to change the laws according to his interests or beliefs, or to be 
compensated when he knowingly enters a country where there is a different 
legal tradition.)
2) Adjudication should be done by a permanent court, with a permanent appel-
late court, with permanent judges chosen on the basis of the highest judicial 
standards. This could either be a newly established Investment Court or one 
of the courts of the constituent countries (e.g. a panel of judges from the 
Supreme Courts of the two countries). This would eliminate the problems 




have made the ISDS process a mockery of justice. (Today, a judge in one case 
can be an advocate in an almost parallel case. He would obviously have an 
incentive in the first case to make a ruling that he could cite to help win the 
second. Judges have an incentive not to rule against the larger countries, since 
the larger countries are embroiled in more suits, and being seen as contrary 
to the interests of the US or another large country may cost one dearly—one 
won’t be chosen to be either judge or counsel, and losing the legitimacy in 
the eyes of these countries may cause the whole system to unravel. This could 
play a role in the oft-cited finding that the larger countries are less likely to 
lose cases. President Obama boasted that the US had never lost a case, though 
Canada had lost more than a dozen NAFTA cases, and settled others in ways 
that were unfavorable to Canada’s broader interests. It may be that the US 
just happened to have better cases, or that it could afford better lawyers; but 
there is a darker, more sinister interpretation, just suggested.) Of course, the 
court/appellate body would be limited to adjudicating state-to-state claims 
for the narrow breaches that should be the subject of investment agreements.
3) The international tribunal adjudicating such disputes should conform to the 
basic principles practiced by commercial courts in the EU and US, includ-
ing those pertaining to evidence, precedence, appeal, and transparency. Of 
course, there are differences among countries in the details of these judi-
cial processes, and a committee of jurists from the relevant countries should 
resolve such differences, with their decisions then approved by the parlia-
ments. (Trade ministers may not be in the best position to judge among alter-
native judicial processes and procedures.) Because issues in one case may have 
relevance in other cases, or be important as matters of principle, non-litigants 
should be allowed to file briefs.
In the private arbitration, others with an interest in the outcome of the case—
those whose lives might be at risk if a regulation were circumscribed or repealed, 
as might likely happen if the corporation seeking damages prevails—cannot typ-
ically present their concerns. Because precedents may play little or no role, two 
almost identical cases can emerge with different outcomes, providing no guid-
ance forward; and with no system of appeal, these problems are exacerbated.
f) What is the mechanism for revision?
The arbitration panels have sometimes come to peculiar or at least unexpected 
or unanticipated interpretations of certain words in an investment agreement. 
An agreement might, for instance, specify ‘appropriate compensation’, not spell-
ing out what that means. An expansive arbitration panel might decide that that 
meant compensation for a loss of expected profits, and with a small number of 
international law firms engaged as judges and advocates in such cases, this may 
become the ‘norm’, contrary, perhaps, even to the expectations of all parties to 




agreements guarantee a “minimum standard of treatment,” a vague standard that 
corporate-friendly arbitrators have interpreted liberally in past decisions, invent-
ing obligations for governments that do not exist in the actual text of agreements 
or host countries’ laws.’
Words are always subject to different interpretations, and when tens or even hun-
dreds of millions of dollars are at stake, good lawyers can make good arguments 
for an interpretation that is favorable to their client, regardless of the costs to soci-
ety. When this happens domestically, the legislature makes a correction, spelling 
out what it is that was meant. With trade and investment treaties, there is no way 
in which such corrections can be made systematically.
So too, economies and technologies change, and a provision that made sense at 
one time may not make sense a quarter or half century later. Built into agree-
ments are specifics, like the time period of data exclusivity for biologics. There 
is disagreement about what the appropriate number should have been in, say, 
2014 (with the President of the United States suggesting 7 years, his own USTR 
arguing for 12 years, many in the scientific community arguing for 0.) But there 
should be no disagreement that whatever that number in 2014, there is no a priori 
reason it should be the same twenty-five years later. Again, there is no systematic 
way for revisions. Opening up an agreement for renegotiation opens up a ‘can 
of worms’. But there should be an understanding that specific provisions (like 
the misinterpretation of certain words by dispute panels) should periodically be 
analyzed and reviewed, and that this should be done not just by trade ministers, 
who often are captured by special interests, but in an open process involving civil 
society, legislators, and others.
Concluding Comments
We have seen that investment agreements are not about discrimination, as their 
advocates dishonestly purport. Indeed, there have been very few cases in which 
the investor succeeded on a claim of discrimination, of receiving less favorable 
treatment than the domestic investor.15 They are about expanding the power of 
15 Based on the data on claims available from UNCTAD (http://investmentpolicyhub.unc-
tad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches), Lisa Sachs and Lise Johnson found ‘that there have only been 
8 cases in which the investor succeeded on a claim that it received less favorable treatment than 
the domestic investor. Importantly, however, in none of the cases did the tribunal find that there 
was intentional nationality-based discrimination against the investor. Rather, liability was usu-
ally based on protection of an upstream segment (e.g. domestic producers of sugar or other agri-
cultural commodities) or downstream segment (domestic producers of hazardous wastes) of the 
value chain that negatively affected the downstream or upstream foreign investor; in other cases, 
liability was a result of disparate treatment in the law (or its enforcement or application) that the 





corporations, at the expense of the rest of society. If investment agreements were 
really about discrimination, they would have been narrower; and in narrowing 
their focus, they would have avoided much of the controversy surrounding them. 
But narrowing their focus would have undermined their true objective.
One of the sources of comparative advantage of the US and other advanced 
countries is their rule of law. Indeed, with capital and skilled labor increasingly 
mobile, this is one of the true sources of comparative advantage. One might won-
der, then, why would advanced countries give up this comparative advantage, 
helping to ensure that developing countries provide even stronger property rights 
than do developed countries? Surely, doing so is not in their national interests. 
But we need to remember: trade and investment agreements are crafted in secret, 
with corporations at the table, and broader interests absent. Such agreements are 
not in the national interest, but in narrow corporate interests. They facilitate the 
movement of jobs out of a country, by ensuring property rights protection when 
factories move abroad, and ensuring the output of those factories easy entry into 
the US (or other advanced country that is party to the agreement), regardless of 
the environmental and labor standards of the country or how those standards 
are enforced. They provide no recourse to those in the advanced country that see 
unfair competition in developing countries not enforcing whatever weak stand-
ards have been agreed to or are encoded in the laws of the country; but provide 
full recourse when corporations’ profits are at risk. The threat of factories moving 
out of a country—to a locale with better property rights protection but fewer 
labor and environmental protections—weakens workers’ bargaining rights. The 
decrease in wages, especially of unskilled workers, may not be a matter of collat-
eral damage in the process of globalization, an unfortunate side-effect; but it may 
in fact have been the ‘main show’.16 This decrease in wages, of course, increases 
profits. The change in property rights—reflected in the regulatory takings pro-
vision—makes it all the more difficult for countries domestically to pass regu-
lations protecting citizens’ welfare, through environmental, health, safety, and 
economic regulations. This too enhances corporate profits, again at the expense 
of the rest of society.
Investment agreements between developed countries and those between a devel-
oped country and developing country pose distinct problems. In both cases, 
investment agreements in their current form should be viewed as an unacceptable 
change in property rights, giving more power to corporations and diminishing 
that of ordinary citizens.
Developing countries may gain jobs, but they pay a high price, as country after 
country has learned. South Africa discovered that it could be sued as it tried to 




rectify through its black empowerment laws a half century of racial discrimin-
ation through apartheid. Egypt discovered that it could be sued as it tried to 
ensure a minimal standard of living for its workers through a minimum wage 
law.
If there is to be investment agreements between developed and developing coun-
tries, they need to be narrowly circumscribed, to issues of discrimination, and 
there is a need to create an international investment court to adjudicate disputes. 
I suspect that corporations will be little interested in such an investment agree-
ment, which would fulfill the purported objective of investment agreements.
But for developed countries, investment agreements are even more problematic. 
These agreements are sold as providing property rights protections not otherwise 
afforded to investors. The objections raised by the proposed agreement between 
the US and EU make clear the lack of logic in these agreements: (1) Both the US 
and the EU have good systems of property rights; (2) Both the US and the EU 
have good judicial systems for enforcing those property rights; (3) If there is a 
deficiency in either the judicial system or the property rights regime, it should be 
remedied for all investors, indeed all citizens, not just foreign investors.
The only justification for an investment agreement is the belief that courts in the 
US will discriminate against corporations from the EU and vice versa. No evi-
dence that this is a real problem has been presented. The investment agreements 
seem to be solving a problem that does not exist. But in doing so, they create mas-
sive new problems, including an undemocratic redefinition of property rights. If 
it were that there were a problem of discrimination, the remedy would be a simple 
agreement, again focusing on discrimination, as a last recourse, after exhaustion 
of domestic courts, with adjudication through an international investment tribu-
nal, not the faux justice of private arbitration.
It is time to see these investment agreements for what they are:  a behind the 
scenes power grab on the part of corporations. At least in their current form, they 
have no place in a democratic society.
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